一、密码规则:至少 8 位且不能全是数字。短信验证可以在后台关掉,关掉之后 密码就是账号质量的唯一门槛,而此前 validUserPassword 只检查非空——"1" 也是合法密码。规则只在「设置密码」时校验(注册、找回、改密、后台建号与 后台重置),登录不再校验,已有账号照常使用。上下限都按字符数计算,否则 43 个汉字的密码会因为字节数超限被拒。各处错误提示改为直接说明规则, 而不是笼统的一句「请填写有效的密码」。 二、离线推送:此前客户端一直在上报 push token,服务端从未下发过任何东西, App 退到后台或被杀掉时新消息完全没有提醒(MESSAGE_PUSH 只是 WebSocket 帧名)。补上服务端下发: - 只发给「此刻不在线 + 未对该会话免打扰 + 未关闭消息通知」的接收者, 在线的人已经从实时通道拿到了。 - 鉴权 token 按 provider 的过期时间缓存,个推的 auth 接口限流很紧。 - 失效的 cid(10001/10002)就地停用,不再每条消息重试一次。 - 整个过程在独立 goroutine 与独立 context 上进行,推送服务再慢也不会 拖慢或拖垮一条已经发出的消息。 - 是否显示正文由 push.show_preview 控制,关闭后锁屏上不出现消息内容。 凭据在管理端「离线推送」页填写(迁移 035 先建出配置行——集成配置保存 走的是 UPDATE,行不存在会静默保存不上)。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
138 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
138 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package app
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import (
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"bytes"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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)
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func productionConfigForTest() Config {
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return Config{
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Port: 8888,
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DSN: "xingyu:password@tcp(mysql:3306)/im",
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JWTSecret: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
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ConfigEncryptionKey: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789",
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Environment: "production",
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AllowedOrigins: []string{"https://app.example.com", "https://admin.example.com"},
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}
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}
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func TestValidateProductionConfig(t *testing.T) {
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config := productionConfigForTest()
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if err := validateConfig(config); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected a valid production config: %v", err)
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}
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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mutate func(*Config)
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}{
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{"root database account", func(config *Config) { config.DSN = "root:root@tcp(mysql:3306)/im" }},
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{"weak jwt", func(config *Config) { config.JWTSecret = "short" }},
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{"missing encryption key", func(config *Config) { config.ConfigEncryptionKey = "" }},
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{"wildcard cors", func(config *Config) { config.AllowedOrigins = []string{"*"} }},
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{"insecure origin", func(config *Config) { config.AllowedOrigins = []string{"http://app.example.com"} }},
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{"demo seed", func(config *Config) { config.SeedDemo = true }},
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}
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for _, test := range tests {
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t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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invalid := config
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test.mutate(&invalid)
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if err := validateConfig(invalid); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected production validation to reject config")
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestPhoneEncryptionRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
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application := &App{config: productionConfigForTest()}
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phone := "13800138000"
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first, err := application.encryptPhone(phone)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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second, err := application.encryptPhone(phone)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if bytes.Equal(first, second) {
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t.Fatal("phone encryption must use a unique random nonce")
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}
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decrypted, err := application.decryptPhone(first)
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if err != nil || decrypted != phone {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected decrypted phone %q: %v", decrypted, err)
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}
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}
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func TestProductionURLValidation(t *testing.T) {
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if !validHTTPSURL("https://pay.example.com/create") {
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t.Fatal("expected HTTPS URL to be accepted")
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}
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for _, value := range []string{"http://pay.example.com", "javascript:alert(1)", "https:///missing-host", ""} {
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if validHTTPSURL(value) {
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t.Fatalf("expected URL to be rejected: %s", value)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestPasswordAndPhoneRules(t *testing.T) {
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if validUserPassword("") {
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t.Fatal("an account must still have a password")
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}
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if !validPhone("13800138000") || validPhone("23800138000") || validPhone("1380013800x") {
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t.Fatal("phone policy is not enforced")
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}
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}
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// Storage and verification carry no policy of their own: any string a person
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// already has must keep working, including the ones the sign-up rule would now
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// refuse. The rule lives at the point a password is set — see
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// TestPasswordRuleAppliesWhereverAPasswordIsSet.
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func TestAnyExistingPasswordStillHashesAndVerifies(t *testing.T) {
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for _, password := range []string{"1", "123456", "a", "password", "!", "中", " ", strings.Repeat("a", 72), strings.Repeat("a", 73), strings.Repeat("密码", 100)} {
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hash, err := hashPassword(password)
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if err != nil || !checkPassword(hash, password) {
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t.Fatalf("password with %d bytes cannot be stored and verified: %v", len(password), err)
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}
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if checkPassword(hash, password+"x") || checkPassword(hash, "") {
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t.Fatal("password comparison ignored a suffix or accepted an empty password")
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}
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config := productionConfigForTest()
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config.BootstrapAdminPassword = password
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if err := validateConfig(config); err != nil {
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t.Fatal("bootstrap admin still enforces password strength:", err)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestLongPasswordHashesAndLegacyCompatibility(t *testing.T) {
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legacyPassword := strings.Repeat("x", 72)
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legacy, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(legacyPassword), bcrypt.MinCost)
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if err != nil || !checkPassword(string(legacy), legacyPassword) || checkPassword(string(legacy), legacyPassword+"suffix") {
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t.Fatal("legacy bcrypt credentials must work without accepting truncated input")
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}
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password := legacyPassword + "a"
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first, err := hashPassword(password)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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second, err := hashPassword(password)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if first == second || !strings.HasPrefix(first, longPasswordHashPrefix) || len(first) > 255 {
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t.Fatal("long passwords require unique salts and a hash that fits existing storage")
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}
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if !checkPassword(first, password) || checkPassword(first, legacyPassword+"b") || checkPassword(first, legacyPassword) {
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t.Fatal("the entire long password must participate in verification")
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}
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for _, invalid := range []string{"", "plaintext", "$argon2id$", strings.Replace(first, "m=19456", "m=999999999", 1), first[:len(first)-1], longPasswordHashPrefix + strings.Repeat("!", 66)} {
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if checkPassword(invalid, password) {
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t.Fatal("malformed hash was accepted")
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}
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}
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}
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